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We would like to compliment the authors on a very nicely designed, conducted, and interpreted study investigating the "July Effect" in plastic surgery. 1 This study is particularly significant because The "July Effect" has not been previously evaluated in plastic surgery. Hypothetically, complications will be higher at the beginning of the academic year, when trainees and new attending surgeons are relatively inexperienced in their new roles and may be in an unfamiliar facility. It is logical to postulate that this inexperience and unfamiliarity will lead to poorer outcomes as compared to the remainder of the year. However, there is no conclusive data to support the existence of this phenomenon.
The National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP) provides highly reliable and reproducible outcomes data that can be used to assess whether a "July Effect" truly exists, and if so, the impact of this phenomenon on patient outcomes. [2] [3] [4] In this study, the authors utilized the NSQIP database to compare the morbidity and mortality for cases with and without trainee in the first quarter of the academic year (AQ1) to those done in the other three quarters (AQ2-4). Appropriately, they controlled for baseline differences in the patient population utilizing propensity score matching. Furthermore, multivariate analysis was performed to control for case complexity, based on relative value units. After data reduction, 5156 plastic surgery procedures were included in their analyses. Compared to cases done in AQ2 to 4, cases performed in AQ1 took 10 minutes longer than any other time period, but the significance of this difference is unknown. Otherwise, the authors found no significant differences in outcomes between AQ1 and AQ2 to 4, indicating a lack of any meaningful "July Effect" in plastic surgery.
Although none of the data are perfect in these types of analyses, it is comforting to know that, as far as these data can inform us, there is no convincing evidence that suggests a July effect exists in plastic surgery. Studies of this type beg the question of why we don't demand better data to drive changes in graduate medical education. Despite the scientific rigor employed in clinical studies to optimize the care of patients, we have been quick to assume we understand the effect of trainees on healthcare, often with very little evidence to support it. In 1984, 18-year-old Libby Zion died under the care of residents at a teaching hospital in New York. Her bereaved and angered father, attorney Sydney Zion, looked for answers, and concluded it was the fatigue of the resident that contributed significantly to her death. "You don't need kindergarten," he wrote in a New York Times op-ed piece, "to know that a resident working a 36-hour shift is in no condition to make any kind of judgment call --forget about life-and-death." 5 His activism led to the creation of New York State laws and ultimately Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) work hour limitations. According to the Washington Post, these changes "revolutionized modern medical education." 5 It was logical; who would question that fatigue was bad for medical decision making? However, many years after the implementation of these work hour restrictions, multiple studies have determined that there is no convincing evidence these changes have improved patient safety. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] Indeed, the initial Flexibility In duty hour Requirements for Surgical Trainees (FIRST) Trial, the only prospective study investigating the effectiveness of ACGME duty hour limitations, did not demonstrate any difference in patient outcomes with regard to when those limitations were eased. 18 Even though NSQIP is a convenient and reliable database, we have to wonder if it collects the type of data needed to determine if there is a difference in outcome related to inexperience. Singh et al 19 looked at closed medical malpractice claims over a 20 year period (prior to ACGME duty hour limits) for cases either involving residents or not, and analyzed them for causative factors/ error. "Error in judgment" and "failure of vigilance" were the two most common causative factors identified in 94% and 74% of cases, respectively, but these did not differ based on whether trainees were involved in the patient care. "Lack of technical competence" was the next most common factor, and was slightly more prevalent in settings with trainees (58% vs 42%). "Lack of supervision" was more commonly a factor in cases where trainees were involved (54% vs 7%), as would be expected, since there are very few individuals requiring supervision in a nontrainee setting. Lower on the list, but still common, were "handoff errors," which were slightly more common in the trainee settings (19% vs 13%) and "excessive workload," also more prevalent in trainee settings (19% vs 5%). "Fatigue" was one of the least common causes of error, but was still more prevalent in trainee settings (2% vs 1%).
If we examine the available NSQIP data in light of where we would expect errors based on Singh et al, 19 how does NSQIP fare? Given the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) requirement for physical presence (hence reasonably assured supervision) during the key portion of an operation, would we expect errors from lack of supervision to be found by investigating surgical site infection, wound dehiscence, or unplanned return to the operating room? Similarly, the likes of cerebral vascular accidents and renal failure would not likely be related to errors that are more common in trainee settings. Lack of supervision in the postoperative period certainly may lead to an increase in deep venous thrombosis, pneumonia and urinary tract infection, etc., as might excessive workload, where prophylactic measures may be overlooked in haste. Handoff errors were the next most common error noted by Singh, and were more prevalent in trainee settings, but it is also harder to logically connect NSQIP data points with handoff-associated errors. Errors related to medications by far top the list of errors related to handoffs (errors related to diagnosis and treatment pale in comparison) and were unimproved after implementing a structured handoff system at multiple institutions. 20 Medication errors may or may not be primarily responsible for some of the complications tracked by NSQIP. Errors related to fatigue were the least most common factor noted by Singh. One might expect these would manifest in ways such as forgetting to prescribe deep venous thrombosis prophylaxis postoperatively, etc., so it is logical to believe that the NSQIP data may reveal differences there. Yet the prevalence of fatigue-related error is so low overall that even large studies based on NSQIP data may be underpowered to detect it.
The current study is a great start in investigating whether novice "July" trainees are detrimental to healthcare, when functioning within the overall system. Using a very reliable database, it reassures us and the public that based upon this study, we can see no detrimental effect. Given July is when inexperience is at its peak and this would be when we would be most likely to see the negative effect of inexperience, lack of an effect here also reassures us that trainees in general do not negatively affect the care of plastic surgery patients. However, NSQIP is not a perfect database for plastic surgery and as a result, we must continue to evaluate the complications we would expect to see with inexperience or with trainee involvement within our specialty. This will better guide us to provide the safest possible care within the context of training tomorrow's plastic surgery workforce. To neglect this duty and rely on logic, or worse, politics, may actually be detrimental to our patients' health. The data from Singh suggest that fatigue is a very minor issue, that errors due to handoffs are 10 times more likely. Ironically, outrage over fatigue led us to implement a system that significantly increased the need for handoffs. We can't afford that kind of science. Let's demand the same rigorous evidence to drive plastic surgery training as we demand to drive plastic surgery care.
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